Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 22

Issue 3

Article 2

3-1-1947

Religious Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment
C. J. Antieau

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
C. J. Antieau, Religious Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, 22 Notre Dame L. Rev. 271 (1947).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol22/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more
information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT*
Since 1940 it has been established 1 that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States makes
applicable to the states the protection of the First Amendment respecting religious freedom: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."
An understanding of the protected scope of freedom of
religion requires a recognition that the United States Supreme Court has safeguarded activity of an essentially religious nature under the cloak of other constitutional freedoms. Frequently the Court has spoken in terms of freedom of speech and press,' and there have been references to
a freedom of silence 8 and a freedom to hear.4 This judicial
amplification of verbiage rather than concept is not always
commendable, but an examination of these other concepts is
imperative to any full determination of the extent and
limits of freedom of religion under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Though freedom to believe is complete, the right of activity in the name of religious liberty is, in its very nature,
not an absolute.5 As Justice Roberts stated in the Cantwell
*In the May issue of the Notre Dame Lawyer an article will appear showing
the genesis of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the First Amendment.
1 Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213- (1940).
2 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed. 949, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 155, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 87 L. Ed. 1315, 63 S. Ct. 862 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943).
3 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 87
L. Ed. 1628, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 147 A. L. R. 674 (1943).
4 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. Ed. 1313
(1943).
5 "The rights with which we are dealing are not absolute."
Douglas, J., in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 110, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 1297 (1943).
Limitations under the Fourteenth Amendment have been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 85 L. Ed. 1049,
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case: ' "The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the
subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand,
it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the
Amendment embraces two concepts - the freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be."
There is no one test the Court has consistently applied in
determining whether or not the particular activity is within
the protection of the constitutional freedom of religion. The
rule of reason I is the easiest to enunciate but the most

difficult in application and the least productive of consistency and system in the development of the concept. The
61 S. Ct. 762, 133 A. L. R. 1396 (1941); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U. S. 568, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942); Prince v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944); and Re Summers, 325 U. S.
561, 89 L. Ed. 1795 (1945).
6 310 U. S. 296, 303, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1218 (1940). See also the dissent of
Justice Murphy in the original Jones v. City of Opelika case, 316 U. S. 584, 618,
86 L. Ed. 1691, 1713 (1942) which dissent has now become the opinion of the
Court in 319 U. S. 103, 87 L. Ed. 1290, 63 S. Ct. 890 (1943): "Freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and freedom of religion all have a double aspect - freedom
of thought and freedom of action. Freedom to think is absolute in its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings
of the mind. But even an aggressive mind is of no missionary value unless there
is freedom of action, freedom to communicate its message to others by speech and
writing. Since in any form of action there is a possibility of collission with the
rights of others, there can be no doubt that this freedom to act is not absolute
but qualified, being subject to regulation in the public interest which does not
unduly infringe the right."
7 "In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Robert, J., in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 304, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1218 (1940). "Street
preaching . . . can be regulated within reasonable limits." Rutledge, J., in Prince
v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 169, 88 L. Ed. 645, 654 (1944).
"We are concerned solely with the reasonableness of this particular prohibition of
religious activity." Murphy, J., dissenting in Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U. S. at 173, 88 L. Ed. at 656 (1944). "Rational justification"
should prevent the legislation from being unconstitutional. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 63 S. Ct. 1178,
1198 (1943).
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clear and present danger test 8 has been recognized as applicable to freedom of religion but blithe disregard of this
test, without disaffirmance, by the majority in the Prince
case 10 leaves doubt as to whether it is to be applied to all
controversies affecting freedom of religion.
The area of religious liberty has been subject to confusion
and uncertainty through the failure of the Supreme Court
to enunciate and apply a test determinant of what activity
is within the Constitutional protection, by a related unwillingness to indicate a usuable criterion of "commercialism"
that would remove an activity from the realm of religious
activity," by contradictions of judicial approach such as the
Court's unwillingness to pass upon the fact of child labor in
the Prince case 12 because the state court had held that it

was, notwithstanding its proper recognition in the Opelika "3
and Murdock " cases of power to pass upon the reality of
"commercialism" even though the state court had so denominated the activity, and lastly, by vacillation "5of members
of the Court.
8 First suggested by Justice Holmes in Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47,
52, 63 L. Ed. 470, 473, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919), where he indicated that speech was
not to be curtailed unless "the words are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
0 Justice Roberts for the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, "In the absence
of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting
a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the petitioner's
communication, considered in the light of the constitutional guarantees, raised no
such clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable
to conviction." 310 U. S. 296, 311, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1221 (1940). Freedom of religion is "susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the state may lawfully protect." Jackson, J., in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 639, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 1638 (1943).
See also dictum in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 157, 167, 88 L. Ed. 645, 653
(1944) and dissent of Mr. Justice Murphy in the Prince case, 321 U. S. at 174,
88 L. Ed. at 657 (1944).
10 321 U. S. 157, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944).
11 Most apparent in the original Jones v. City of Opelika case, 316 U. S. 584,
62 S. Ct. 1231 (1942).
12 Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 157, 88 L. Ed. 645
(1944).
13 Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231 (1942).
14 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292.
15 Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy felt they erred in the Gobitis case
(310 U. S. 586) (1940) and took occasion to admit their error at the time of the
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Such a situation demands something more than a case-tocase approach. The only satisfactory handling of the area
seems to require an analysis of all the individual conflict
situations that have arisen, with examination of the most
frequently contradictory social and personal interests, and
without anticipating consistency of rule or test from one
conflict situation to another.
Freedom of Religion versus tke Tax Power
The distribution of religious literature in return for
money when done as a method of spreading the distributor's
religious beliefs is an exercise of religion within the First
Amendment and immune from taxation. After vacating its
judgment in the original Jones v. Opelika case,' the Supreme Court, at the October Term, 1942, handed down its
decision in Murdock v. Pennsylvania1'which established
that an ordinance imposing a flat license tax on distributors
of religious materials, who were thus engaged in religious
worship, was an unconstitutional invasion of the rights of
freedom of religion and of speech and press. For the enjoyment of a right, such as freedom of religion, guaranteed by
the federal Constitution, a state cannot exact a license tax.
It should be obvious that the power to tax the exercise of religious worship is the power to suppress it.'" As Justice
Jackson stated in the Murdock case,' 9 "The power to impose
a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as
original hearing of Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, at 623-4 (1942). When
the identical issue as in the Gobitis case was again presented in the Blarnette case
(87 L. Ed. 1628) (1943) only Mr. Justice Frankfurter continued in his belief that a
compulsory flag salute was not violative of freedom of religion. The original
Jones v. City of Opelika decision was, of course, vacated by the Supreme Court
in 319 U. S. 104, 87 L. Ed. 1291 (1943).
16 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231 (1942).
Criticized by many commentators.
See: Antieau, "State Regulatory Laws and Religious Freedom" (1942), 6 U. Det.
L. J. 131.
17 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943). Case noted in (1943) 42 Mich.
L. R. 163.
18 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 78 L. Ed. 1109, 54 S. Ct. 599
(1934) and cases cited therein.
19 319 U. S. 105 113, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 1298 (1943).
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potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down." It is easy to realize how readily
itinerant ministers would be "impoverished if subjected to
license taxes by every community in which they preached or
distributed literature.
To claim that a tax on the distribution of religious literature has constitutional validity because it is non-discriminatory is to advance no justification whatsoever. Recalling
the language of the late Chief Justice Stone in the original
Jones v. Opelika case, Justice Jackson effectively disposed
of this assertion: 20 "The fact that the ordinance is 'nondisciminatory' is immaterial. The protection afforded by
the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax does
not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the
privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the
wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats
them all alike.
Such equality in treatment does not save
the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position."
Though conceding that the power to tax the dissemination
of religious ideas "may be used to restrict" them,21 the dissenting Justices, Reed, Roberts and Frankfurter indulge at
length in historical interpretations of the protections contained in the First Amendment. If there is one thing we
should have learned by now it is that the historical approach
has no contribution to make to an understanding of the
proper place of religious liberty in contemporary America.2 2
We have a right to expect that a more mature society will
rise above the irrational bigotry and religious persecution
of the eighteenth century. Certainly one proof of societal
20
21

319 U. S. 105, 115, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 1300 (1943).
319 U. S. 105, 130, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 1307 (1943).

22 For a scholarly criticism of the historical approach, see Summers: "The
Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom" (1946) 41 Ill.
L. R. 53, 56. To determine the extent of religious liberty, "the historical argument is wholly inconclusive
... the Founding Fathers were novices in the field of religious freedom, for they
had come from a background of bigotry and lived in an era of intolerance." See
also, Myers, "History of Bigotry in the United States" (1943).
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growth is recognition of the right of religious minorities to
propagate their faith though their ideas are distasteful to
today's majority.
The implication of Mr. Justice Reed that the majority
opinion means "that church or press is free from the financial
burdens of government" 23 is a distortion of both reality and
the clearly expressed views of his colleagues. Listen to
Justice Douglas speaking for the majority: 24 "We do not
mean to say that religious groups and the press are free
from all financial burdens of government. We have here
something quite different, for example, from a tax on the
income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax
on property used or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact
a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon."
Again, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in
Follett v. McCormick 23 carefully explains that exemption
from tax on the distribution of religious materials as part of
religious worship "does not mean that religious undertakings must be subsidized. The exemption from a license tax
of a preacher who preaches or a parishioner who listens does
not mean that either is free from all financial burdens of
government, including taxes on income or property. But to
say that they, like other citizens may be subject to general
taxation does not mean that they can be required to pay a
tax for the exercise of that which the First Amendment has
made a high constitutional privilege." It is interesting to
note that in Follett v. McCormick, Justice Reed concurs
with Justice Douglas and the majority of the Court.
Taxation and materialistic statism have their defender in
Mr. Justice Frankfurter who would allow such a tax on religious worship. Speaking of governmental benefits, he
23

319 U. S. 105, 127, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 1306 (1943).

24
25

319 U. S. 105, 112, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 1298 (1943).
321 U. S. 573, 577, 88 L. Ed. 938, 941 (1944).
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says: 2 "To secure them costs money, and a state's source
of money is its taxing power." This sort of statement merely reiterates the obvious. The question remains whether
taxation is to be a possible majority weapon to deprive religious minorities of the basic freedom to spread the faith
they believe. There are adequate sources of tax revenue
without infringing upon these "preferred constitutional
privileges." Mr. Justice Frankfurter also states: 27 "There
is nothing in the Constitution which exempts persons engaged in religious activities from sharing equally in the costs
. . ." Remarks such as this are deceptively unjust to ministers who share with all of us such costs as the property
tax, the estate tax, the sales tax, the luxury tax, the poll
tax, etc., etc. Just where is this "exemption" of which the
learned Justice speaks?
Without more merit is the claim that itinerant ministers
add measurably to the costs of government, so as to
justify additional taxation. Justice Frankfurter's notion of
"extra benefits" is daily belied in hundreds of instances. For
example, read the testimony in Busey v. District of Columbia:2" "Two police officers testified they (Jehovah's Witnesses) were not disorderly, and the prosecution's witnesses
stated that they did not disturb the peace 'before, during or
after arrest,' were 'quiet, not bothering anybody, were
courteous and did not say anything out of the way at all.'
They did not 'occupy too much space on the sidewalk,' did
not have a stand, and nothing was spread out on the sidewalk." Neither in the Opelika case 2 9 nor in the Murdock
case," ° to mention but two, was there any showing or even
claim by the state that the amount of the tax bore any reasonable relation to extra costs occasioned by, or extra benefits rendered to Jehovah's Witnesses. That the burden of
26

319 U. S. 105, 140, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 1313 (1943).

27
28

Ibid.

29
30

129 F. (2d) 24, 35 (1942).
316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231 (1942).
319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943).
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proving the extent of the expenses of licensing and regulation, so as to establish whether or not the fees exacted by
the ordinance were in excess of the expenses of licensing,
is properly on the state, see the Busey case "' where the
Court held "that when legislation appears on its face to
affect the use of speech, press or religion, and when its
validity depends upon the existence of facts which are not
proved, their existence should not be presumed; at least
when their existence is hardly more probable than improbable, and particularly when proof concerning them is more
readily available to the government than to the citizen."
One pays for the benefits of political life in these United
States - including the privilege of religious freedom under conditions of equality with one's fellow citizens. It
seems neither common sense nor political wisdom to devise
intricate accounting techniques capable of ascertaining the
exact "extra benefits" conferred on smokers using the streets,
for example, and charging them for the additional services
rendered.
Nor is there anything startling in the decision of the Murdock case. It should be remembered that not even the majority in the original Jones v. Opelika case were willing to
hold that the state's tax power extended to non-commercial
activity. It was because they considered the activity commercial that the tax was sustained, as witness the words of
Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, "But it is because
we view these sales as partaking more of commercial than
religious transactions that we find the ordinances, as here
presented, valid." 32 The minority in the original Jones v.
Opelika case, whose position is now that of the Court, clearly
indicated that a flat license tax on the distribution of religious literature was unconstitutional. Mr. Chief Justice
Stone in his dissent stated: 11 "They (the First and Four138 F. (2d) 592, vacating 129 F. (2d) 24, D. C. App. (1943).
82 316 U. S. 584, 598 (1942).
83 316 i. S. 584, 608, 86 L. Ed. 1707 (1942).
81
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teenth Amendments) extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it is a condition of the exercise of the
privilege, is capable of being used to control or suppress it."
The late Chief Justice added, ". .

on its face a flat license

tax restrains in advance the freedom taxed and tends inevitably to suppress its exercise. The First Amendment prohibits all laws abridging freedom of press and religion, not
merely some laws or all except tax laws.". And, Mr. Justice
Murphy, also dissenting in the original Opelika case, stated: " "Respondents do not show that the instant, activities
of Jehovah's Witnesses create special problems causing a
drain on the municipal'coffers, or that these taxes are commensurate with any expenses entailed by the presence of
the Witnesses. In the absence of such a showing I think no
tax whatever can be levied on petitioners' activities in distributing their literature or disseminating their ideas."
In Follett v. McCormick 11 the Supreme Court held that
a tax on the distribution of religious materials as part of a
religious observance is equally unconstitutional when the distributor's activities are confined to his home town and he
depends for his livelihood on contributions requested in return for the literature distributed. Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court, stated: " "A flat license tax on that
constitutional privilege would be as odious as the early 'taxes
on knowledge' which the framers of the First Amendment
sought to outlaw. A preacher has no less a claim to that
privilege when he is not an itinerant ...The exaction of a tax
as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed
by the First Amendment is as obnoxious as the imposition
of a censorship or a previous restraint. For, to repeat, 'the
power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.' "
84 316 U. S. 584, 620, 86 L. Ed. 1714 (1942). See also the words of Mr.
justice Murphy, concurring in Martin v. Struthers: The distribution of religious
literature cannot be conditioned "upon payment of a license tax for the privilege
of so doing." 319 U. S. 141, 150, 87 L. Ed. 1317, 1321 (1943).
8S 321 U. S. 573, 88 L. Ed. 938 (1944).
36 321 U. S. 573, 577, 88 L. Ed. 938, 941 (1944).
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The power of the state to charge a nominal regulatory
fee for services rendered belongs more properly under a discussion of the police power and ft will be there examined,
but before leaving the conflict-area of freedom of religion
versus the tax power a word of warning from the Supreme
Court jurist who has shown the greatest recognition of
fundamental values and evangelistic pragmatics, "It is wise
to remember that the taxing and licensing power is a dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of unscrupulous
or bigoted men, could be used to suppress freedoms and destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds," 7
Freedom of Religion versus the Police Power;
(a) Prohibitionand Censorship
Neither a state nor a municipality can completely bar the
distribution of religious literature on its streets, sidewalks,
and public places or make the right to distribute dependent
on a permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at
will."
The Cantwell case held unconstitutional as an unreasonable infringement of religious freedom a Connecticut statute
subjecting to fine anyone soliciting for a religious cause without having first secured a license from the secretary of the
state public welfare council who could deny the license if
he felt that the cause was not "a religious one" or was not
"a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy." Mr. Justice
Roberts, speaking for the Court, said: " "No one would
contest the proposition that a state may not, by statute,
wholly deny the right to preach or to disseminate religious
views. Plainly such a previous and absolute restraint would
violate the terms of guaranty . . . Such a censorship of religion (as allowing the state official to pass upon the 're37 Mr. Justice Murphy in Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, 579, 88 L.
Ed. 938, 942 (1944).
38 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 60 S. Ct. 900,
128 A. L. R. 1352 (1940).
89 310 U. S. 296, 304, 84 L. Ed. 1213 1218 (1940).
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ligious' cause) as a means of determining its right to survive
is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and
included in the liberty which is within the protection of the
Fourteenth." Justice Roberts added,4" "To condition the
solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or
systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a
religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise
of liberty protected by the Constitution." This was the
rule of law espoused by a unanimous Court in the Cantwell
case.

Since Lovell v. Griffin 41 it has been clear that the right to
distribute handbills concerning religious subjects on the
streets may not be prohibited at all times, at all places, and
under all circumstances.
In Jamison v. Texas 42 the Court re-emphasized this rule,
basing it on freedom of religion as well as on freedom of
speech and press - only speech and press had been mentioned in the Lovell case, and held that it applied even
though the literature being distributed contained an advertisement or invitation to contribute to the missionary work
of the Jehovah's Witnesses by purchasing books related to
the faith of the group. Though recognizing the rule of
Valentine v. Chrestensen43 that states can prohibit the use
of the streets for the purpose of purely commercial leaflets,
even though such leaflets may have "a civic appeal, or a
moral platitude" appended, the Court properly held this was
religious, not commercial activity, and hence not subject to
prohibition. States or municipalities "may not prohibit the
distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly religious
activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of
books for the improved understanding of the religion or be41
42

310 U. S. 296, 307, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1219 (1940).
303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed. 949, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938).
318 U. S. 413, 87 L. Ed. 869 (1943).

48

316 U. S. 52, 55, 86 L. Ed. 1262, 1265, 62 S. Ct. 920 (1942).

40
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cause the handbills seek in a lawful fashion to promote the
raising of funds for religious purposes." There was no dissent in Jamison v. Texas.
Largent v. Texas4 4 was decided the same day as Jamison
v. Texas and the United States Supreme Court took occasion
to repeat that a municipal ordinance making it unlawful to
distribute religious literature without first obtaining a permit which is to be issued only if the mayor deemed it proper
or advisable was an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of religion, and press and speech.
Also at the October Term, 1942, the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Martin v. City of Struthers.4"
The City of Struthers, Ohio, had enacted a municipal ordinance making it unlawful for any person distributing
literature "to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or
otherwise summon the inmate . . . to the door." The Court
held that, as applied to the distribution of religious literature,
the ordinance was an unconstitutional violation of freedom
of speech and press. Here there is a clash between the right
of distribution of religious literature and "the interest of the
community which by this ordinance offers to protect the interests of all its citizens, whether particular citizens want
that protection or not." 11 Though Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, does not mention freedom of religion, it
is obviously involved here and Mr. Justice Murphy, in a
concurring opinion,4 7 speaks at length of its applicability.
In this view he is joined by Justices Douglas and Rutledge.
From the view of the majority in the Struthers case Justice
Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the police power
should be large enough to ban the ringing of doorbells, and
that the legislature is the judge of necessity, not the Court.
Mr. Justice Reed, joined by Justices Roberts and Jackson,
44

318 U. S. 418, 87 L. Ed. 873 (1943).

45

319 U. S. 141, 87 L. Ed. 1313, 63 S. Ct. 862 (1943).

46

319 U. S. 141, 143, 87 L. Ed. 1313, 1316 (1943).

47

319 U. S. 141, 149, 87 L. Ed. 1313, 1320 (1943).
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dissented on the view that the city council was proper agent
for the householders in forbidding bellringing, and that "The
ordinance seems a fair adjustment of the privilege of distributors and the rights of householders." 4 8
Nor can managers of a company-owned town bar all distribution of religious literature within the town, or condition distribution upon a permit issued at the discretion of its
management. Marsh v. Alabama,4" decided at the October
Term, 1945, held that a state statute making it a crime to
enter or remain on the premises of another after having
been warned not to do so is, when applied to distributors of
religious literature on a street of a company-owned town,
contrary to the wishes of the town's management, unconstitutional as an infringement of the guarantees of freeddm
of press and of religion. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for
the Court, said: "0 "The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of
these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing
those who attempt to distribute religious literature clearly
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter joins the majority in the Marsh case. The dissent by
Mr. Justice Stone, and Justices Reed and Burton, is particularly strange considering the attitude of the late Chief
Justice in earlier cases, and without particular merit. The
dissenters indulge in this language,5 1 "The rights of the
owner (of the company town) . . . are not outweighed by
the interests of the trespasser, even though he trespasses in
behalf of religion or free speech." The language of the law
of property is not particularly useful in dealing with the
"preferred constitutional privileges" of freedom of religion
48
49
50
51

319 U. S.
90 L. Ed.
90 L. Ed.
90 L. Ed.

141, 157, 87 L. Ed. 1313, 1324 (1943)
(Adv. Op.) 227 (1945).
(Adv. Op.) 227, 230 (1945).
(Adv. Op.) 227, 235 (1945).
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and press. A company-town is primarily a community of
American citizens, entitled to Constitutional privileges, and
secondarily a piece of privately-owned property.
Also decided January 7, 1946, was Tucker v. Texas 52
which differed from the Marsh case only in that a companyowned town was not involved, but rather a Federal Government owned and operated village. The Court ruled that the
management of a governmentally-owned village could not
prohibit distribution of religious literature, or make it contingent upon a permit which might be denied at will. A
state statute that makes it unlawful for a distributor of religious literature to refuse to leave the government-owned
village after notification by possessor is unconstitutional as
violative of the guarantees of freedom of religion and press.
As in the Marsh case, the late Chief Justice Stone and Justices Reed and Burton dissented on grounds already indicated.
Freedom of Religion versus the Police Power;
(b) the Public Peace
Recognizing that the cases in this area will inevitably exemplify the conflict-situation between freedom of religion
and the interest of the state in the preservation of peace and
good order, the problem here is to weigh the conflicting interests with an approach such as that indicated by the Court
in Cantwell v. Connecticut: has the State's interest "been
pressed ... to a point where it has come into fatal collision
with the overriding interest protected by the federal compact?" 53
When first recognizing Fourteenth Amendment protection
to freedom of religion, the Court made it clear that preservation of the public peace would at times necessitate reasonable inroads into the area of religious liberty. Justice
52

53

90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 235 (1946).
310 U. S. 296, 307, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1220.

Italics supplied (1940).
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Roberts, speaking for the Court in the Cantwell case,
stated: " "It is equally clear that a state may by general
and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the
places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of
holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community
without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Later in the same case,"
"The state is likewise free to regulate the time and manner
of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety,
peace, comfort or convenience."
And, again,5" "No one
would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of
freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to
physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When
clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with
traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state
to punish is obvious."
However, as the Court pointed out 11 in the Cantwell case,
it will take something more than the generalized and indefinite concept of the common law breach of peace to infringe
upon freedom of religion under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The state must employ "a statute narrowly drawn to define
and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger." 58 And freedom of religion will prevail in those
cases resting on speech to another when there is "no assault
or threatening of bodily harm," no "statements likely to
provoke violence and disturbance of good order," "no
truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal
abuse." 59
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Within the same year, the United States Supreme Court
had occasion to determine that a statute, properly drawn
and interpreted, could constitutionally limit activity claimed
by the actors to be a form of religious worship. In Cox v.
New Hampshire 60 the Court sustained the conviction of five
Jehovah's Witnesses who, with sixty-three others, paraded
without a permit on a busy Saturday evening along the
crowded main streets of Manchester, a city of 75,000 people. The New Hampshire statute 61 read: "No theatrical
or dramatic representation shall be performed or exhibited,
and no parade or procession upon any public street or way,
and no open-air public meeting upon any ground abutting
thereon, shall be permitted, unless a special license therefor
shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town, or
from a licensing committee for cities hereinafter provided
for." The statute also provided for licensing fees ranging
from a nominal sum to three hundred dollars. The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire had interpreted the statute to provide that the board could take into consideration only the
convenience of the public use of the highways in granting or
refusing a license for a particular place and time, and that
it could not discriminate. The State Court held that the
defendants "had a right under the Act, to a license to march
when, where and as they did, if after a required investigation it was found that the convenience of the public in the
use of the streets would not thereby be unduly disturbed,
upon conditions or changes in time, place and manner as
would avoid disturbance." The State Supreme Court had
held that the statute in no way regulated the distribution
of religious literature by individuals or groups not constituting a parade or a procession. The highest State Court had
also ruled that the fee section of the Act permitted only a
"reasonable" fee, "not a revenue tax, but one to meet the
expense incident to the administration of the Act and the
60
61

312 U. S. 569, 85 L. Ed. 1049 (1941).
New Hampshire Public Laws, chapter 145, section 2.
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maintenance of public order in the matter licensed." So interpreted and so applied, the statute was not an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of religion, speech or press.
Chief Justice Hughes, for the Court, likened the need for
conformity to reasonable traffic regulations to the necessity
to conform to the common traffic signal. "One would not be
justified" he remarked,62 "in ignoring the familiar red traffic
light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the
municipal command or sought by that means to direct public
attention to an announcement of his opinions." In disposing
of the claim that the statute as so interpreted violated constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, the late Chief
Justice stated: 63 "The argument as to freedom of worship
is also beside the point. No interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is shown,
but only the exercise of local control over the use of streets
for parades and processions." This is loose, meaningless,
and dangerous language. The defendants obviously thought
their right of religious worship was interfered with, and
there was no contest of their sincerity. "In any proper
sense" has absolutely no utility as a test beyond this case
and these speakers. The late Chief Justice spoke with more
claim to consideration when he suggested 64 that a usable
test in this sort of conflict-situation should be this: "The
question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right
of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of
thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially
associated with resort to public places."
Cox v. New Hampskire is authority for the rule that police
power can constitutionally make inroads into religious
liberty by (1) statutorily requiring persons contemplating
a public parade or procession on streets or sidewalks to make
62
63

312 U. S. 569, 574, 85 L. Ed. 1049, 1053 (1941).
312 U. S. 569, 578, 85 L. Ed. 1049, 1055 (1941).
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prior application for a permit which can be denied by public officials acting reasonably and without discrimination only
on grounds of inconvenience to the public use; and (2) requiring the payment of a reasonable and nominal fee for the
issuance of the permit, said fee to be no larger than the costs
of issuance and extra police expense directly occasioned by
the activity licensed.
In 1942 the Supreme Court recognized another limitation
on religious liberty under the police power. A New Hampshire statute 6 provided that "No person shall address any
offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who
is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him
by any offensive or derisive name . .." The State Supreme
Court had earlier held 66 that the purpose of the statute was
to preserve the public peace, no words being "forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence
by the persons to whom individually the remark is addressed." While being brought to a police station by a
traffic officer, a Jehovah's Witness called the city marshal
"a damned Fascist" and "a damned racketeer." The defendant attempted to introduce evidence of alleged neglect
of duty on the part of the police, but the trial court refused
to admit and the State Supreme Court sustained, holding
that neither provocation nor the truth of the utterance would
constitute a defense to the charge. So interpreted, the statute was held constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court, and the conviction of the Jehovah's Witness sustained. Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court,- disposed of the claim that freedom of religion was violated in
these words: 67 "And we cannot conceive that cursing a publice officer is the exercise of religion in any sense of the
term. But even if the activities of the appellant which preNew Hampshire Public Laws, chapter 378, section 2.
State v. Brown, 68 N. H. 200, 38 A. 731 (1895); State v. McConnell, 70
N. H. 294, 47 A. 267 (1900).
67 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 1035
(1942).
65
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ceded the incident could be viewed as religious in character,
and therefore entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, they would not cloak him with immunity from
the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in
violation of a valid criminal statute." Justice Murphy indicates that the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and religion does not extend to "the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 88 Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire thus holds that one engaged in religious
worship, at least to his own creed and notion, has no claim
to protection of freedom of religion or speech when he violates a statute by uttering "offensive, derisive or annoying"
words which "men of common intelligence would understand
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to
fight." The present author has little enthusiasm for such a
rule. The remedy of damages for slander will ordinarily be
effective compensation to one denominated a fascist or
racketeer in a religious sermon. Walking away, in the usual
situation, might even be considered. When freedom of religion and speech is at stake, what prevents the United States
Supreme Court from passing upon the propriety of a state
statute which denies the defense of provocation in slander?
This hardly seems consistent with the judicial techniques
indorsed by Mr. Justice Murphy in the original Opelika case
and by the Court in the Murdock case where commercialism
was decidedly an open question notwithstanding the fact that
the state court had spoken on this point. And, what does
Justice Murphy mean when he says, "they (constitutional
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment) would not cloak
him with immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid criminal
statute." Whether or not the infringing statute is "legal"
and "valid" is the question to be decided by the Court...
68
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this is not predetermined. Further, Mr. Justice Murphy has
elsewhere stated that any legislative attempt to infringe upon
religious freedom is prima facie invalid. In Prince v. Massachusetts,69 he states, "The human freedoms enumerated
in the First Amendment and carried over into the Fourteenth
Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable, and any
attempt to sweep away those freedoms is prima facie invalid." One wonders if religious freedom under the rule of
the Chaplinsky case is large enough to protect Him who said
of another, "Pharisee," an annoying appellation in its time."
As indicated earlier, Martin v. City of Struthers71 holds
that the police power does not enable a municipality to decide for all of its inhabitants that distributors of religious
literature can not ring door bells or knock on the door to
call the attention of the residents to their literature and their
ideas. This is not a matter to be decided by organized society, but by individual residents who might, by such a
sweeping ordinance, be denied the right to receive ideas.
There is indication 72 in the Struthers case that a properly
drawn statute could prohibit such ringing of door bells, etc.,
at homes where the residents had indicated that such was
not their wish.
Freedom of Religion versus the Police Power;
(c) Protection of Children
In 1944 the United States Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts7
69

321 U. S. 158, 173, 88 L. Ed. 645, 656 (1944).
Riesman in 42 Col. L. R. 1282, 1311 (1942) indicates, in commenting on
the Chaplinsky case, that "the law can usually afford to disregard the most serious
political defamation by a Witness against a non-Witness."
71 319 U. S.141, 87 L. Ed. 1313, 63 S. Ct. 862 (1943).
72 "The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has proposed a form
of regulation to its member cities (We do not by this reference, mean to express
any opinion on the wisdom or validity of the particular proposals of the Institute)
which would make it an offense for any person to ring the bell of a householder
who has appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed. This or any
sinrilar regulation leaves the decision as to whether distributors of literature may
lawfully call at a home where it belongs - with the homeowner himself. A city
70

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

which established that the state could constitutionally prohibit a girl under eighteen from disseminating religious literature on the streets, although she believed that by so doing
she was discharging a religious duty. Here the claim of religious freedom was denied before the conflicting right of
the state to protect children. The Massachusetts statute
made it a crime for a boy under twelve or a girl under eighteen to "sell, expose or offer for sale" literature or merchandise, and also made it a crime for a guardian to "compel or
permit" a minor under his control to "sell" such articles.
Mrs. Prince, the defendant, permitted her nine year-old
ward to distribute the "Watchtower" and "Consolation."
The evidence is clear that they were no farther than twenty
feet apart at the time of distribution. Mr. Justice Rutledge,
speaking for the Court, indicated clearly 7 that the clash
was between "on one side the obviously earnest claim for
freedom of conscience and religious practice" and "the
parent's claim to authority . . . in the rearing of her chil-

dren," and "against these sacred private interests, basic in a
democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the welfare of children and the state's assertion of authority to that
end." He conceded that "a statute or ordinance identical in
terms.., except that it is applicable to adults or all persons
generally, would be invalid." " The Court was obviously
thinking in terms of the dangers from child labor and quite
properly concerned for the welfare of the child. However,
there was no clear and present danger to- the child or to
society on the facts of the Prince case. The youngster was
not working in a factory nor even unaccompanied on the
street.
From the decision of the majority in the Prince case,
Justice Murphy dissents on the ground that "religious traincan punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will
of the occupant . . ." 319 U. S. at 148, 87 L. Ed. at 1319 (1943).
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ing and activity, whether performed by adult or child, are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against interference by state action, except insofar as they violate reasonble regulations adopted for the protection of the public
health, morals and welfare," " and that "the state . . .has
completely failed to sustain its burden of proving the existence of any grave or immediate danger to any interest
which it may lawfully protect." " Like the majority, Mr.
Justice Murphy recognizes that this case presents "a square
conflict between the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom and the state's legitimate interest in protecting the
welfare of its children." With the majority, Justice Murphy
indicates that the test is that of reasonableness. "We are
concerned solely with the reasonableness of this particular
prohibition of religious activity by children," he states."
So long as he feels the test is one of reasonableness, one cannot overlook the fact that the Legislature of Massachusetts
thought it reasonable, as did the other members of the Court.
Elsewhere, Justice Murphy indicates that perhaps the clear
and present danger test should apply to this conflict-situation79 and the test is not disaffirmed by the majority.8 ° If
Mr. Justice Murphy believes that clear and present danger
is the proper test, this would have been the case to forsake
the language of reasonableness and stress the applicability
of Holmes' idea to the conflicts of police power versus the
freedom of religion.
In the Prince case the Court was unwilling to pass upon
the interpretation of the State Court that the distribution
of religious literature in the usual manner of Jehovah's Witnesses constituted a "sale" by the girl, so as to bring both
76
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her and her guardian within the sanctions of the statute.8 '
This is an amazing about-face from the Court's holding in
the Opelika 2 and Murdock 83 cases where the Court was
quite willing to hold that there was no "commercialism" involved in distributing religious literature, even though the
state courts had so denominated the activity. When basic
and fundamental liberties are involved, certainly the interpretation of the activity (vastly different from interpretation
of the statute) should be within the scope of the Supreme
Court's powers.
The present author feels that the Court erred in its decision in the Prince case for it is obvious that there was in
substance no child labor on the facts of the case. The child
was accompanied and protected by her aunt, and the activity was undeniably of a religious nature. To deny the
rights of religious worship when there is no clear and present
danger to either the child or society is inadvisable. 4
Although the Prince case clearly makes inroads into the
concept of freedom of religion under the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no justification for an assumption that the
state can now prohibit the religious activities of altar boys
or others worshiping their God in churches and off the
streets. Mr. Justice Rutledge, for the Court, went to considerable length to indicate that the rule of the Prince case
is not to be expanded. "Our ruling does not extend beyond
the facts the case presents," he stated. 5 "We neither lay
the foundation 'for any (that is, every) state intervention
in the indoctrination and participation in religion' which
81 "As the case reaches us, the questions are no longer open whether what
the child did was a 'sale' or an 'offer to sell' . .. or was 'workl'" 321 U. S. 157,
163, 88 L. Ed. 645, 650 (1944).
82 Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231 (1942).
83 Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed.

1292 (1943).
84 An excellent criticism of the rule of the majority in the Prince case is contained in Green, "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 43 Mich. L. R.
437, 442 (1944).
85 321 U. S. 158, 171, 88 L. Ed. 645, 655 (1944).
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may be done 'in the name of their health and welfare' nor
give warrant for 'every limitation on their religious training
and activities.' The religious training and indoctrination
of children may be accomplished in many ways, some of
which, as we have noted, have received constitutional protection through decisions of this Court. These and all others
except the public proclaiming of religion on the streets, if
this may be taken as either training or indoctrination of the
proclaimer remain unaffected by the decision."
Freedom of Religion versus the Police Power;
(d) Defense of the State
Since West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,," it is clear that the state or municipality may not require of students compelled to be in school a compulsory
flag salute contrary to their religious beliefs. There the
United States Supreme Court took occasion to expressly
overrule its earlier holding to the contra in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis 7 The Court now recognized that
patriotism cannot be instilled by forcing ritual and symbolism on one whose deepest religious beliefs hold such activity abhorrent. Mr. Justice Jackson saw the "ultimate
futility of such attempts to compel coherence," 88 and added,
"To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the
appeal of our institutions to free minds." 89
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy concurred in separate
opinions. Justices Black and Douglas, in reversing their
position from the earlier Gobitis case, joined in stating,9"
86 319 U. S. 624, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943). Case noted in 42 Mich. L. R.
319 (1943).
87 310 U. S. 586, 84 L. Ed. 1375, 60 S. Ct. 1010 (1940).
88 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 641,
87 L. Ed. 1628, 1639 (1943).
89 Ibid.
90 319 U. S. 624, 644, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 1640 (1943).
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"We cannot say that a failure, because of religious scruples,
to assume a particular physical position and to repeat the
words of a patriotic formula creates a grave danger to the
nation." They now believe "that the statute before us fails
to accord full scope to the freedom of religion secured to the
appellees by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." "
Mr. Justice Murphy feels that freedom of religion far outweighs any benefits that might accrue to the state from compulsory declarations of allegiance which "requirement is not
essential to the maintenance of effective government and
orderly society." 92
Justices Reed and Roberts dissent without opinion beyond the brief word that they believe the rule of the Gobitis
case should be continued. Justice Frankfurter wrote a
lengthy dissent in which he admitted that "patriotism cannot be enforced by the flag salute," 98 but he persuasively
stressed his belief that it is not the function of the Court
to enforce the liberal spirit on illiberal legislatures.
In the Barnette case the United States Supreme Court indicated most certainly that the test of clear and present
danger is applicable to the clash of religious freedom versus
the police power. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court,
said: "' "It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to
prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate
and urgent grounds than silence. But here the power of
compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and
present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle
expression:"
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Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court in the Barnette
case, distinguishes it from Hamilton v. Regents of University
of California05 in that attendance at the University of California was optional, whereas school attendance in the instant
case was required. Furthermore, "that case is also to be
distinguished from the present one because . . . the State
has power to raise militia and impose the duties of service
therein upon its citizens," ' which, of course, was not at
issue in the Barnette case. Justice Frankfurter does not
consider the distinction apt and remarks,9 7 "The Constitution does not give us greater veto power when dealing with
one phase of 'liberty' than with another, or when dealing
with grade school regulations than with college regulations
that offend conscience." As when he spoke for the majority
in the now over-ruled Gobitis case, Justice Frankfurter believes that the propriety of the legislation is for the legislature and not the Court. "Rational justification" " is the
test of constitutionality and he finds it in the act of the
legislature and also in the fact that thirteen justices of the
Supreme Court had at one time considered such legislation
reasonable and constitutional. To an extent not found in
the other cases the Court in the Barnette case indicates that
the rule of reason or "rational justification" is not the determinant of constitutionality, but rather the test of clear
and present danger. Furthermore, since Schneider v. New
Jersey 90 it has been clear that there is no presumption of
constitutionality to a legislative enactment limiting civil
rights. Certainly there was no clear and present danger to
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98 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 63 S. Ct. at 1198
(1943), cited supra.
99 308 U. S. 147 at 161 (1939): "In every case therefore, where legislative
abridgment of the rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the
effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions."

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

the defense of the land by the failure of an elementary
school student to assume a position supposedly symbolizing
patriotism.
In 1945 freedom of religion again clashed with the defense of the state in re Summers.'
There the majority
of the court held that a state could constitutionally deny
admission to the bar to one otherwise qualified who was unwilling to serve in the state militia, if ever required, because
of a religious belief in non-violence. Petitioner was a conscientious objector and "the sincerity of petitioner's beliefs
are not questioned." '01 Resting heavily on the analogy to
the federal government's refusal to grant citizenship to the
alien who refused to pledge military service, the majority
felt that the State of Illinois could insist that "an officer
who is charged with the administration of justice must take
an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois" and indicate
"a willingness to perform military service." 2
From the position of the majority, Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissent in forceful and persuasive
language. Justice Black "cannot believe that a state statute
would be consistent with our constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion if it specifically denied the right to practice law to all members of one of our great religious groups,
Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish." 108 Yet, he points out, the
Quakers would every one be barred from the practice of law
if they remain true to the tenets of their faith. The dissenting justices are "not ready to say that a mere profession of
belief in (Christ's) Gospel is a sufficient reason to keep
otherwise well qualified men out of the legal profession, or
to drive lawabiding lawyers of that belief out of the profession, which would be the next logical development." 104
325 U. S. 561, 89 L. Ed. 1795
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Truly there is room for growth in our concept of freedom
of religion when five of the members of the Court feel there
is no unreasonable infringement of religious liberty when
one otherwise qualified is denied admission to the bar solely
because he believes in literally following the words of Christ.
The facile doctrine that privileges can be denied, even though
rights can not, has already occasioned more sophistry and
abuse than justice and it is time to be disavowed. Surely
the right to employment should not be conditioned upon
orthodoxy of religious belief any more than religious tests
can be required of federal office holders."0 5 The purpose of
professional qualification statutes is not to encourage the
superficial externals of hypocrisy, but to protect society from
unqualified practitioners. If the applicant possesses the
skills of his profession and a sense of responsibility to his
clients, he should not be denied the right to practice.
There is presently considerable room to doubt whether
the United States Supreme Court would again hold as it
did in the Summers case if faced with the problem anew. As
indicated above, the Court relied heavily on the Schwimmet 106 and Macintosh 107 cases for analogy. "It is impossible for us to conclude" stated 108 Mr. Justice Reed, for the
majority, "that the insistence of Illinois that an officer who
is charged with the administration of justice must take an
oath to support the Constitution of Illinois and Illinois' interpretation of that oath to require a willingness to perform
military service violates the principles of religious freedom
which the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state action, when a like interpretation of a similar oath as to the
Federal Constitution bars an alien from national citizenship." In 1946 the Supreme Court in Girouard v. United
no religious test shall ever be required
105 U. S. Const., Art VI, § 3; "...
as a qualification to any office of public trust under the United States."
106 U. S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 73 L. Ed. 889, 49 S. Ct. 448 (1929).
107
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States 109 set aside the rule of the Schwimmer and Macintosh
cases. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in the
Girouardcase, stated,"' "We conclude that the Schwimmer,
Mdcintosh and Bland cases do not state the correct rule of
law." The statutory requirement that an applicant for
citizenship take an oath to support and defend the Constitution does not operate to exclude from citizenship one unwilling, because of religious scruples, to take up arms in defense of the country. The following words of Mr. Justice
Douglas would be most appropriate in application to the
facts of the Summers case: "The struggle for religious
liberty has through the centuries been an effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of
the individual. The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of
conscience there is a moral power higher than the State." "'
With this rectification of the rule of the Schwimmer case
there is less reason in analogy than in logic for perpetuation
of the undesirable rule of the Summers case. It is to be
hoped that the United States Supreme Court will set aside
this unfortunate 112 decision at an early opportunity.
Freedom of Religion versus the Police Power;
(e) Preventing Public Frauds
Since the United States Supreme Court first recognized
the Fourteenth Amendment protection of religious freedom,
it has been clear that the state has power to prevent public
90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 776 (1946).
90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 776, 781 (1946).
111 Girouard v. U. S., 90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 776, 780, 781 (1946).
112 The decision in re Summers is capably criticized in 19 So. Cal. L. R. 53
(1945), "It is submitted that fitness to practice as a lawyer is not gauged by
personal religious beliefs. Is it not conceivable that this 'test oath' to undertake
military service might well be required of plumbers, architects, realtors, or other
of the many fields in which state licenses are prerequisite to practice? If so, to
what extent will it be carried? Is the power to earn a living to be regulated by
one's religious beliefs? Were this followed to a logical conclusion, it would be
entirely possible to exclude from any or all professions one or more of our great
religious groups - as for example the Quakers, whose very creed is bottomed
on non-violence."
109
110
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fraud by appropriate technique, even though there is an attendant inconvenience to ministers of religion and other distributors of religious literature or solicitors of funds for religious purposes. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the
Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, stated: "I "Nothing we
have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the
cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds
upon the public. Certainly penal laws are available to
punish such conduct. Even the exercise of religion may be
at some slight inconvenience in order that the state may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt a state may
protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring
a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly
to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and
his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent."
It seems obvious that reasonable regulations can be drawn
that will prevent or limit public frauds by solicitors of funds
while still preserving the right of persons to legitimately
distribute and solicit. Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring in
Martin v. City of Struthers,"' states: "No doubt there may
be relevant considerations which justify considerable regulation of door to door canvassing, even for religious purposes, - regulation as to time, number and identification of
canvassers, etc., which will protect the privacy and safety
of the home and yet preserve the substance of religious
freedom."
An interesting case involving freedom of religion as a defense to a prosecution for using the mails to defraud is
United States v. Ballard.15 The First Amendment, rather
than the Fourteenth, is concerned but the approach and rule
would be equally applicable to a similar situation under the
latter. The Supreme Court there held that the Constitu113

310 U. S. 296, 306, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1219 (1940).
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tional guaranty of freedom of religion prevented a jury from
passing upon the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or
doctrines professed by the accused. If the defendants
honestly and in good faith believed the things said in statements sent throught the mail there was no use of the mails
to defraud, so said the District Court. The jury found the
defendants guilty, but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of conviction and granted a new trial because
it felt that the restriction of the issue to that of good faith
was error. In turn, the Circuit Court was reversed because
the Supreme Court did "not agree that the truth-or verity of
respondent's religious doctrines or beliefs should have been
submitted to the jury." "' Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the Court, said: 117 "The religious views espoused by
respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous to
most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then
the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect."
The case was remanded to the Circuit Court to pass upon
other objections to constitutionality made by the accused.
In a dissenting opinion Justice Jackson indicated that the
whole prosecution should be defeated. He "would dismiss
the indictment and have done with this business of judicially
examining other people's faiths." 18 At the other extreme
were the late Chief Justice Stone and Justices Frankfurter
and Roberts. They were "not prepared to say that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of religion affords immunity
from criminal prosecution for the fraudulent procurement of
money by false statements as to one's religious experiences
, 119 They felt that there was no legally sufficient reason for disturbing the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury
and recommended that the verdict be reinstated.
11D

322 U. S. 78 at 86, 88 L. Ed. 1148 at 1153 (1944).

117 322 U. S. 78 at 87, 88 L. Ed. 1148 at 1154 (1944).
118 322 U. S. 78 at 95, 88 L. Ed. 1148 at 1158 (1944).
119 U. S. v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 at 88, 88 L. Ed. 1148 at 1155 (1944).
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In spite of the three separate opinions in the Ballard case
it seems clear that freedom of religion is not, of itself, a defense to a prosecution for the fraudulent procurement of
money, but that no jury is permitted to pass upon the merits
of the religious beliefs and doctrines of the accused in such
a prosecution.
Freedom of Religion versus Property Rights
Since Martin v. City of Struthers there has been considerable opinion that the right of privacy of the home has been
violated at the expense of freedom of religion. This is largely attributable to the loose language of Mr. Justice Jackson
in his dissent: "Nor am I convinced that we can have freedom of religion only by denying the American's deep-seated
conviction that his home is a refuge from the pulling and
hauling of the market place and the street. For a stranger
to corner a man in his home, summon him to the door and
put him in the position either of arguing his religion or of
ordering one of unknown disposition to leave is a questionable use of religious freedom." 120 This is an unfortunate
interpretatior of the position of the majority. Careful examination of the Court's position should indicate clearly
that the householder has been denied no rights by the rule
of the Struthers case. He can refuse to answer the door;
he can order any obnoxious caller off the property and
use reasonable force to eject the trespasser; he can post
a sign indicating that certain callers are unwelcome, and can
sue violators for damages in trespass. Furthermore, the
words of the majority are heavy with the implication that
the state or municipality need only provide for decision
where it belongs - with the householder, and so providing,
a criminal trespass statute will most certainly be sustained.1 2 '
319 U. S. 141 at 181, 87 L. Ed. 1313 at 1338 (1943).
"Traditionally the American law punishes persons who enter onto the
property of another after having been warned by the owner to keep off. General
trespass after warning statutes exist in at least twenty states, while similar statutes
of narrower scope are on the books of at least twelve states more . . any similar
120
121

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Not a word of the majority opinion justifies the position that
the rights of privacy have been violated. The Struthers
case merely prevents the state or municipality from denying
the householder the right to receive ideas and literature.
The decision is with the individual, not with the body'politic.
Speaking for the Court in the Struthers case, Mr. Justice
Black stated: 122

"The ordinance ...

substitutes the judg-

ment of the community for the judgment of the individual
householder.." He added: 123 "The dangers of distribution
can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he
will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition
can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution,
the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas."
The conflict between freedom of religion and private
property has to now been most direct in Marsh v. Alabama.124 There the Supreme Court held that a companyowned town, though private property, cannot exclude a distributor of religious literature. Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for the Court, remarked: 125 "We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the question

... Owner-

ship does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in. general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it... Whether a corporation or a municipality
owns or possesses the town, the public in either case has an
identical interest in the functioning of the community in
such manner that the channels of communication remain
free."
regulation leaves the decision as to whether distributors of literature may lawfully call at a home where it belongs - with the homeowner himself." 319 U. S.
148, 87 L. Ed. at 1319.
122 319 U. S. 141 at 144, 87 L. Ed. 1313 at 1317 (1943).
128 319 U. S. 141 at 147, 87 L. Ed. 1313 at 1319 (1943).
124 90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 227 (1946).
125 Marsh v. Alabama, 90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 227 at 229 (1946).
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Future conflict-situations in this area will be well resolved
if the Court continues the approach indicated by Mr. Justice
Black in the Marsh case: "When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here,
we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position." "
Freedom of Religion and the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court
It is, of course, too early to attempt a statement of the
Chief Justice's philosophy of either the concept of religious
freedom or the role of the judiciary, although his background is that of a liberal and there seems little reason to
believe that he will narrow the area of constitutionally protected freedom of religion.
Mr. Justice Murphy has been the most zealous of the
high court jurists in protecting freedom of religion under
the Fourteenth Amendment. His judicial philosophy is best
indicated by these words from his concurring opinion in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: "Reflection has convinced me that as a judge I have no loftier
duty or responsibility than to uphold that spiritual freedom
to its farthest reaches." 117 As indicated earlier 121 Justice
Murphy continues to subscribe to the test of reasonableness
in determining constitutional derogations of the freedom,
and so long as he does he will have to recognize that considerable weight must be given to the opinion of the legislature and his colleagues as to the reasonableness of any attempted infringement. He has indicated approbation of the
clear and present danger test 129 but he is apparently not
ready to advance this as the determinant of constitutionality
10m
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in the area of religious freedom. Of course, Mr. Justice
Murphy believes that freedom of religion is in preferred
position when the Court faces conflicts involving religious
liberty and other public or private interests. 3
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, and to a
somewhat lesser degree, Mr. Justice Rutledge, have been unwilling to sustain the attempted infringements of religious
freedom. Mr. Justice Black clearly considers freedom of
religion to occupy a "preferred position." "I
In this attitude he is joined by Mr. Justice Douglas who, in speaking
for the Court in the Murdock case, said: 132 "Freedom of
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position." Although these three members of the court
blithely overlooked the clear and present danger test in the
Prince case,' 3 3 in spite of advocacy by counsel, Justices Black
and Douglas have at other times indicated recognition that
it is applicable to the area of religious freedom.' 3 4 There
seems little likelihood, however, that they will substitute
this for the test of reasonableness in the usual case involving
freedom of religion.
In the Barnette case Mr. Justice Jackson showed some
solicitude to protect freedom of religion against the claims
of police power. There he even indicated that he felt the
clear and present danger test was applicable to conflictsituations involving freedom of religion. "It is now a commonplace," he said,' 3 5 "that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only
when the expression presents a clear and present danger of
130 See, for example, his concurring opinion in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S.
at 151, 152, 87 L. Ed. at 1321 (1943).
131 Marsh v. Alabama, 90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 227, 231 (1946).
132 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. at 115, 87 L. Ed. at 1300 (1943).
133 Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U. S.at 167, 88 L. Ed.
at 653 (1944).
134 See concurring opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S.at 644, 87 L. Ed. at 1640 (1943).
135 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. at 633,
87 L.Ed. at 1635 (1943).
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action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and
punish." However, he dissented in the Struthers case, the
Murdock case, and the Follett case, and joined with the
restrictive majority in the Prince and Summers cases. Justice
Jackson's attitude is probably best indicated by his concurring opinion in the Prince case: 136 "This case brings to
the surface the real basis of disagreement among members of
this Court in previous Jehovah's Witness cases... Our basic
difference seems to be as to the method of establishing limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom. My
own view may be shortly put: I think the limits begin to
operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with
liberties of others or of the public." Justice Jackson also
indicated that, in his opinion, constitutional protections of
religious freedom end when the individual leaves the church.
In speaking of asking for contributions in public, he
states: '8' "All such money-raising activities on a public
scale are, I think, Caesar's affairs and may be regulated by
the state so long as it does not discriminate against one because he is doing them for a religious purpose, and the regulation is not arbitrary and capricious, in violation of other
provisions of the Constitution." Seemingly, Justice Jackson
cannot be expected to expand the present Constitutional
concept of freedom of religion.
Justice Reed has usually been found with those willing to
allow triumph of some other interest, public or private, over
freedom of religion. He believes in the clear and present
danger test as applied to the constitutional concept of freedom of speech. In the case of Pennekamp v. Florida, he
stated: "I "A theoretical determinant of the limit for open
discussion was adopted from experience with other adjustments of the conflict between freedom of expression and
maintenance of order. This was the clear and present
136
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danger rule.. . We are not willing to say under the circumstances of this case that these editorials are a clear and present danger." Is it that Mr. Justice Reed feels that freedom
of religion is entitled to a lesser Constitutional protection?
In the short time Mr. Justice Burton has been on the high
court it is difficult to ascertain his philosophy concerning the
Constitutional protection of freedom of religion. In the
Marsh "' and Tucker 4 0 cases, however, he joined with Mr.
Justice Reed in dissenting, and these indications point to
the probability of his viewing the judicial and Constitutional
protection of freedom of religion rather narrowly.
The attitudes of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in condoning infringements of the concept of religious freedom have appeared particularly paradoxical to many of his friends, but
his reasons are well set forth in his dissenting opinion in the
Barnette case. There he stated: 141 "One who belongs to
the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not
likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our
Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I
should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general
libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they
do the thought and action of a lifetime." However, he makes
it clear, "one's own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a
law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one's
duty on the bench"; 142 with Holmes, he agrees, "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." 143
Furthermore, he detects a serious inconsistency between the
contemporary Holmesian attitude of the Court in giving
great respect to the legislative will when due process is involved, and according lesser respect when freedom of reMarsh v. Alabama, 90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 227 (1946).
Tucker v. Texas, 90 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.) 235 (1946).
141 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. at 646,
87 L. Ed. at 1642 (1943).
142 319 U. S. at 647, 87 L. Ed. at 1642 (1943).
143 319 U. S. at 649, 87 L. Ed. at 1643 (1943).
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ligion, speech and press are at issue. The closing paragraph
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent is exceptional judicial
prose: "Of course patriotism cannot be enforced by the flag
salute. But neither can the liberal spirit be enforced by
judicial invalidation of illiberal legislation. Our constant
preoccupation with the constitutionality of legislation rather
than with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of the American
mind with a false value. The tendency of focusing attention on constitutionality is to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom, to regard a law as all right if it is
constitutional. Such an attitude is a great enemy of liberalism. Particularly in legislation affecting freedom of thought
and freedom of speech much which should offend a freespirited society is constitutional. Reliance for the most
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found
outside of their vindication in courts of law. Only a persistent positive translation of the faith of a free society into
the convictions and habits and actions of a community is
the ultimate reliance against unabated temptations to fetter
the human spirit." 144
In Pennekamp v. Florida,4 ' Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicates that he does not consider the clear and present
danger test to be applicable to the great majority of cases
involving freedom of speech, press, and religion. " 'Clear
and present danger' ", he states, "was never used by Mr.
Justice Holmes to express a technical legal doctrine or to
convey a formula for adjudicating cases." In his dissent in
the Prince case he had said, 4 "But to measure the state's
power to make such regulations as are here resisted by the
imminence of national danger is wholly to misconceive the
origin and purpose of the concept of 'clear and present
danger.' To apply such a test is for the Court to assume,
however unwittingly, a legislative responsibility that does
not belong to it."
144
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Under Mr. Justice Frankfurter's philosophy of the role of
the Court in a democracy it is for the legislature, rather than
the judiciary, to be the protector of our fundamental liberties. Admittedly this controversy and decision is basic to the
democratic process. Surely, the fundamental freedoms of
religion, press and speech will be better protected and more
zealously safeguarded if every legislature is every day convinced of such a sense of values. However, the present author feels that Justice Frankfurter errs in his renunciation
of judicial power. It is not a denial of the fundamentals of
the democratic process to doubt that every one of our legislatures will day in and day out respect the fundamental freedoms of the American way of life. To ensure that these
un-American and unconstitutional acts would be wiped out
as soon as possible was one of the very important reasons
for adopting a system of checks and balances. To doubt the
eternal wisdom of "today's majority" is the very heart and
essence of a system of constitutional government. 4 7 Judicial restraint must continue to be imposed upon the aberrant instances of legislative irrationality. To respect the
legislative will is one thing; to sanctify it above the Constitution is something else.
C. J. Antieau.

147 "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy . . .", West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 63 S. Ct. 1178, at 1185 (1943).

